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ORIGINALISM'S RACE PROBLEM
JAMAL GREENEt

I was surprised to learn recently, from Ron Chernow's illuminating
biography, that George Washington's teeth might have been pulled from
the mouths of his slaves.' I suppose I should not have been surprised. I
certainly knew that Washington kept slaves. I even knew that he was
capable of uncommon barbarity with respect to his slaves, forcing them,
2
for example, to clear swamps in the bitterest of winter chill. But even as
a relatively sophisticated consumer of American legal and political history, I have been partly captured by the romantic myth around Washington. He paid for the teeth, it seems, 3 but the fact that he bought them
from someone from whom he was extracting free labor on pain of lash
(or worse) cannot help but lower Washington another notch in my
imagination.
I recount this inner intellectual conflict as an entr6e into a question
that I have been puzzling with for some time, and that this brief essay
can better identify than resolve. The question is whether, and if so to
what degree, a tension exists between African-American identity and
originalism. I do not mean to ask whether it is possible for someone who
identifies as African-American to hold originalist views about constitutional interpretation. It is of course possible, as Justice Thomas might
attest.4 I also do not mean to ask whether someone who identifies as African-American should be an originalist. I reject the illiberal notion that
my own views should have much to say about the relationship between
another's race and her political or intellectual commitments. The question, rather, is whether African-Americans have especially good reason
to reject originalism, such that selling African-Americans on originalism
carries, and reasonably should carry, an unusually high burden of persuasion.
I suspect that for many this sounds like an easy question, but I doubt
that everyone who thinks it is easy agrees on the answer. On one hand, if
we believe that we can identify interpretive methodologies with constitutional outcomes, and if we believe that originalism in particular is identified with outcomes that African-Americans tend not to support, then we
have a simple explanation for why many African-Americans might not
t Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Olati Johnson and Jed
Purdy for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1.

RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 438 (2010).

2.
3.
4.

See id. at 496.
Id. at 438.
See Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996).
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have warm feelings toward originalism. This explanation, though, is contingent on a set of assumptions about African-American political views
and about the actual or perceived substantive outcomes originalism entails. Those assumptions might go some way toward explaining why so
few African-Americans in fact identify as originalists,5 but it does not
answer the more fundamental question of whether the methodology itself
is or is not, for lack of a better term, racially sensitive.
One potential answer, in the negative, relies on a version of what is
often called the "dead hand" 6 argument, and it feels especially urgent
when it comes to matters of race. A familiar formulation goes something
like this: Accepting the authority of the original understanding of the
Constitution requires one to accept that the ratifying process has significant democratic purchase.7 The reason we do not accept the constitutions
of France or Zimbabwe or Utah as binding the rest of us is that those
constitutions were enacted through processes in which we had no say.
The Constitution of 1787 was submitted to ratifying conventions intended to be representative of relevant members of the population, but, as
we all know, those conventions were not in fact representative. Voting
for delegates to the state conventions largely excluded women, Indians,
blacks, and those who did not own property.8 The Constitution is as to
those marginalized persons as the Zimbabwe Constitution is to the rest of
us, and so its authority must follow not from its democratic pedigree but
from some other, more inclusive account. 9
If we accept that argument, it applies not only to racial minorities
but also to women and even, perhaps, to many poor people. But the special urgency on issues of race derives from the institution of slavery and
its associated badges and incidents. It is not just that people of African
5. In a recent study, my co-authors and I found that only four percent of African-American
survey respondents (compared to 29 percent of whites and 32 percent of Hispanics) are originalists,
where originalists were identified as those falling within the top quartile along a continuous index of
several different measures of originalist affinity. Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 356, 406 (2011).
6. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008).

7. I acknowledge that one might distinguish between originalism as purely a question of
textual exegesis-divining the meaning of a text-and originalism as an authoritative guide to judicial or political decision-making. This dichotomy sometimes goes under the label "interpretation"
versus "construction." See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 99 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
ORIGINAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-11 (1999); Larry Alexander,
Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 144 (2010). In my experience this distinction has cur-

rency only for specialists; most participants in methodological discourse, including legal scholars,
hold a conception of originalism that relies on an account of the political authority of the framers'
original intent or the original understanding of members of the ratifying generation. See generally
Samaha, supra note 6, at 636-37.
8. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 240-42 (1913); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 7 (2005).

9.

See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial ofthe United States Constitution,

101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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descent were not represented at Philadelphia or at the state ratifying conventions, but that the Constitution that emerged from those conventions
preserved and protected both slavery itself and slavery's institutional
infrastructure. Start with the three-fifths clause, which counted slaves as
three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation and direct taxation.'o Slaves obviously could not vote in southern states, and so bringing
slaves into a state would increase a state's congressional representation
without giving blacks any additional political power. This is a bad incentive.' The three-fifths compromise also affected the Electoral College,
since a state's number of electors is based on its congressional representation. It is no coincidence that all but two elected Presidents before Lincoln-the exceptions being one-termers John Adams and John Quincy
Adams-were slaveholders or expressed deep and open sympathy with
slaveholding interests.
The Constitution included two other direct accommodations for
slavery: the Fugitive Slave Clause, which required states to return any
escaped slaves and which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, prevented states from affording due process to their black citizens who were
accused of being fugitive slaves; 3 and the importation clause, which
prevented Congress from withdrawing from the international slave trade
prior to 1808.14 The importation clause was one of only three expressly
unamendable provisions in the 1787 Constitution, along with the prohibition on disproportionate capitation taxes (designed to prevent arbitrary
taxation of slaves) and equal state suffrage in the U.S. Senate.' 5 All three
were concessions to states' rights, the constitutional terms through which
much of the nation's institutionalized racism has been defended.
There are answers to this charge. The most persuasive is the simplest: slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Constitution's most obvious slavery-protecting provisions have been excised.
The process of constitutional design was unrepresentative along racial
lines in 1787, but the Constitution that emerged from that process has
been amended so as to be more inclusive. The Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted expressly to guarantee civil equality, and six of the last thirU.S. CONsT. art. 1, §2, cl. 3.
Of course, the three-fifths compromise also increased the tax base of southern states
beyond what it would have been if slaves counted neither for representation nor for direct taxation,
but it is worth noting that the Constitution also provides that all revenue bills must originate in the
arguably perversely malapportioned House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1. Moreover, per capita tax revenue represented a small share of federal-tax income in antebellum America.
See AMAR, supra note 8, at 93-94.
12.
Paul Finkelman, Thomas R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS
U.L. REV. 75, 89 (1999).
13.
U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2 cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 622-23 (1842).
14.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 1.
15. U.S. CONST. art. V. The prohibition on disproportionate capitation taxes, like the importation clause, could be amended after 1808.
10.

I1.
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teen constitutional amendments have related to voting rights, with every
one of them expanding the franchise. 1 6 Correctly practiced, originalism
fixes on the whole Constitution, as amended, and it is to that Constitution
we should look in assessing originalism's democratic provenance.
More generally, to the extent the dead hand problem as I have articulated it is a problem, it is not a "race" problem. The challenge to the
democratic representativeness of the Philadelphia Convention and the
state ratifying conventions is one we all share, regardless of race. It is
indeed the central challenge of constitutionalism more generally: How
can any political document retain democratic authority across successive
generations? Many able scholars have offered answers to that question,
but the important point here is that it looms so large that it overwhelms
considerations of the representativeness of the founders along racial
lines. Put another way, all successful strategies for overcoming the problem of intertemporal constitutional authority accommodate the problem
of racial representation at the founding. If originalism can surmount the
intertemporal hurdle, as many believe it can, whatever remaining defects
it might have as a mode of constitutional interpretation would not derive
from the fact that the constitutional conventions were not racially inclusive.
This response might be adequate to one especially narrow version
of the dead hand argument, but for at least two reasons it is not adequate
to my original question. First, the most persuasive originalist response to
the problem of intertemporal authority raises additional, less easily dismissed race-related complications. One common originalist answer to the
problem seeks to identify some way in which current generations have
consented to constitutional provisions that justifies preserving the original understandings of those provisions.' 8 For reasons I have elaborated
elsewhere, consent is not a persuasive justification for relying on original
understanding to answer current constitutional questions, not least because few Americans have a defensible understanding of what originalism would entail for constitutional law in practice.' 9 A better, more interesting originalist response to the intertemporal problem is to argue that
the authority of the ratifying generation derives from its normative continuity with our own. On this argument, we are a complicated, multifaceted "people" constituted across time and in constant search of our better

16.

U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVi.

17. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalismand the Good Constitution,
98 GO. L.J 1693, 1697, 1757-64 (2010) (defending originalism in part on the ground that constitutional provisions marginalizing women and blacks have been amended or excised).
18. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47
ND. L. 1, 3-4 (1971) (suggesting that the American people have consented to an originalist reading of the Constitution).
19. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism,97 GEO. L.J. 657, 668-70 (2009).
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selves. 2 0 The originalist claim is that we locate our true values by looking
backward rather than laterally or forward. On this account, originalism is
best defended as a persuasive form of ethical argument; it is a normative
account of national identity.21
So understood, the divide between originalists and living constitutionalists is between those who believe we are at our best when we are
who we have been and those who believe we are at our best when we are
who we might become. Jack Balkin has expressed this divide through the
competing aspirational narratives of constitutional "restoration" and constitutional "redemption." 22 For Balkin, originalism may accommodate
both narratives-one might faithfully work out the meaning of broad
constitutional text either by fixing it in the past or by reimagining it in
the service of subsequent social and political agendaS23-but for most
everyone else, originalism is centrally committed to and indeed fixated
on a narrative of restoration. As Justice Scalia has written, the purpose of
constitutionalism from an originalist perspective is to "obstruct modernity," and to prevent current majorities from diluting or altering the values of the past. 24 On this understanding, the potential for a race problem
becomes more transparent. For me, as an African-American, a narrative
of restoration is deeply alienating; what America has been is hostile to
my personhood and denies my membership in its political community.
The only way I can call this Constitution my own is to view it through a
lens of redemption, the lens that originalism rejects.
Accounts of the authority of original understanding that do not rely
on a narrative of restoration might avoid this problem, but few can avoid
a second, related but more trenchant race-based critique. Originalism
need not in theory, but in practice almost always assumes that the meaning of any particular constitutional provision is fixed at some historical
moment.25 Indeed, I would argue that its claim as to the determinacy of
constitutional meaning is the single most consistent distinguishing fea-

20.

See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM

AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-

GOVERNMENT 145 (2001) ("Commitmentarian democracy holds that a people, understood as an
agent existing over time, across generations, is the proper subject of democratic self-government.").
21.
See Jamal Greene, On the OriginsofOriginalism, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1, 82-85 (2009). Some
strategies for addressing the intertemporal problem consist in ignoring it-that is, defending originalism on prudential or pragmatic grounds. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 116-17 (2004) (arguing that originalism cannot be

justified based on consent, but is normatively appropriate because it best preserves individual liberty); John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, A PragmaticDefense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U.L.
REV. 383, 385 (2007) (defending originalism on the ground that supermajoritarian processes produce
superior political rules). My argument does not turn on whether these defenses are persuasive.
22. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 301, 308-09
(2007).
23.
Id. at 295-303.
24.
See Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER
OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313, 315 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995).

25.

Again, Balkin is a lonely dissenter on this point. See supranote 22, at 295-303.
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ture of originalism, whose definition can otherwise be elusive. Insisting
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed is an especially unsympathetic response to the challenge Robert Cover posed nearly three decades
ago in his essay Nomos andNarrative.2 7 Cover criticized hyper-positivist
modes of interpretation as being, in his term, "jurispathic."28 On this
conception the judge who understands herself to be promulgating the
uniquely correct application of a legal norm is engaged in an act of violence, insofar as she is destroying the alteinative conceptions advanced
by dissenting normative communities. 29 Cover urged instead that judges
"stop circumscribing the nomos" and recognize the possibility of plurality within legal interpretation. 30
African-Americans constitute a nomic (not to say monophonic)
community, if not generally, then around particular constitutional issues
likely to affect them. The role of the jurispathic judge in a case implicating our nomos is either to adopt it or to suppress it in favor of a competing one. This binary is not one any minority community likely wishes to
face, but it is especially daunting for one whose relative discreteness and
insularity leads and has historically led it both to be excluded from and to
resist normative assimilation. A jurispathic approach to legal interpretation wishes to deny that unassimilated norms hold legitimate claims to
legal authority. Yet, the possibility of indeterminacy, of plurality, within
law is precisely the mischief for which originalism is often promoted as
an especially effective remedy.3 1 Originalism treats nomoi that diverge
from the one blessed by the originalist judge as a scourge that it is the
function of law to eradicate.
Constitutional methodology translates, between word and deed,
hope and reality, authority and violence. To choose a methodology is to
choose the connective tissue between Constitution and subject. It is to
adopt a narrative that enables a people not merely to submit to the state
but to experience the Constitution as theirs. For that choice to be right, it
needs to feel right; it must resonate with how one in fact experiences
one's relationship with the nation and its commitments. A raciallysensitive constitutionalism must always, therefore, hold out the possibility of legitimate dissent from history. Originalism denies that possibility,
and so for me, as I suspect for many African-Americans, it speaks in a
foreign tongue.

26.
REV. 325,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y
326-27 (2009).
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
Id. at 40.
See id.
Id. at 68.
Greene, supra note 21, at 74.

